With the violent attacks of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) gaining traction in Iraq and Syria and a media campaign that is nearly as aggressive, the need for effective counter-narrative strategies to prevent the spread of violent extremism and terrorism is more relevant than ever. While ISIS has since broken away from mainstream Al-Qaeda leadership, its origins in relation to Al-Qaeda have helped it quickly establish some legitimacy and authority among those they wish to radicalize and recruit. ISIS has also benefited from roots in Al-Qaeda in terms of inheriting a developed communications strategy, which ISIS has altered and improved to better fit their needs. This can be seen in the release of two online issues of Dabiq magazine during Ramadan (July 2014) and the press attention given to ISIS-related hashtags on Twitter such as #All- EyesOnISIS or #CalamityWillBefallUS. In fact, recent discussions of Dabiq attribute a significant number of the magazine’s messages to narratives from the former leader of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.1 In other words, the narrative of the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” relies in part on the narratives of Al-Qaeda. Thus, any analysis of the media strategy of ISIS, or attempts to counter its narrative, should also include an analysis of the organization that preceded it.