This article looks at the impact of the Egyptian Islamic Group’s decision to abandon violence as a means to an end in 1997 on Al Qaeda (via proxy through Egypt’s al-Jihad organisation), and how this narrative could be used to help dismantle the jihadi terrorist movement generally. Though al-Jihad followed Islamic Group’s lead by deradicalizing on a behavioural and ideological dimension, it did not follow suit on an organizational level. The article also points out that several Islamist leaders have argued that without the IG’s de-radicalization process, there would not have been an al-Jihad one. As a policy recommendation that report states that external social interaction aiming to influence Islamist leaders coupled with selective inducements could be key factors in de-radicalizing militant groups. However, the article interestingly states that though elimination of the “spiritual” leaders of a militant movement could be perceived as a media/psychological victory for a government, it would make a comprehensive de-radicalization process less likely to succeed as those very leaders were seen as necessary in facilitating an internal and genuine dialogue with their own followers. It should be noted that the article makes no distinction between deradicalization and disengagement.